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THE EXPANDING LIABILITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSULTANTS TO THIRD PARTIES
JOEL SCHNEIDERt
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the liability landscape upon which en-
vironmental consultants practice has changed drastically. This is
due to the fact that consultants are increasingly being sued by third
parties with whom they did not contract.' Reported cases show a
definite trend toward naming consultants in significant and com-
plex lawsuits seeking economic losses and cleanup costs. The cases
frequently arise under state common law principles whereby the
plaintiffs argue that a consultant with whom they did not contract
owed them a duty of care. There is also a growing line of cases
addressing a consultant's liability for Superfund cleanup costs in
situations where a consultant had no expectation that he would be
involved in paying for the cleanup of hazardous wastes.
The cases in this area present a particularly vexing problem for
consultants since third parties to their contracts bring suit and since
the damages sought often dwarf the value of the underlying con-
tract and any profit actually earned.2 Further, plaintiffs seek dam-
ages that were not contemplated when the work was undertaken
and the claims relate to work that the consultant did not agree to
perform.3 Moreover, even if the consultant ultimately succeeds in
its defense, the victory comes at a high price. These complex cases
typically involve staggering defense costs as well as numerous par-
ties and experts.
t Mr. Schneider is a 1980 graduate of Villanova University School of Law and
a Member at Archer & Greiner, P.C. Mr. Schneider's practice areas include Envi-
ronmental Law, Toxic Tort, Litigation, Products Liability, Labor and Employment
Law, and Mediation.
1. See JAY FEINMAN, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES, § 1.1 (2000)
(noting that aside from primary duty of care to their clients many professionals are
now excepted from owing duty of care to third parties).
2. See id. at § 1.2 (stating economic losses to third parties can be substantial as
losses can extend along chains of causation to persons far removed in time and
contract from the consultant).
3. See id. at § 1.3. Problems occur when liability is imposed beyond the con-
tract because "it upsets the parties' own allocation of rights and duties, diminishes
their ability to regulate their own affairs, introduces inefficiencies into the process
and raises the threat of indeterminate liability." Id.
(235)
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The increasing potential for consultant liability to third parties
arises in many different contexts. 4 Most early cases filed against
consultants involved accidents resulting in personal injuries. While
personal injury cases continue to be filed, third party suits against
consultants for environmental cleanup costs, economic losses, dam-
ages caused by unsuccessful business deals, and Superfund contri-
bution costs have become more prevalent. Representative cases
include:
" A consultant was sued by an assignee of its contract for
failing to identify hazardous waste contamination in an
assessment report.5
" After its business collapsed, a neighbor to GE's contami-
nated property sued GE's consultant for negligently per-
forming a site investigation. 6
" A company whose site came to be included on the Na-
tional Priorities List sued the government's contractor
whose alleged negligence led to the listing.7
" A consultant hired to assist a client with regulatory com-
pliance issues was sued by an unknown purchaser of the
property who discovered substantial mercury contami-
nation of property designated for residential housing.8
4. See id. at § 1.1 (noting many professionals including lawyers, accountants,
architects, engineers, and appraisers are subject to third party liability).
5. See Bronstein v. GZA Geoenvironmental, Inc., 665 A.2d 369 (N.H. 1995)
(finding no tort liability because consultant owed no duty of care to ultimate pur-
chasers of property). For a further discussion of Bronstein, see infra notes 97-106
and accompanying text.
6. See Midwest Aluminum Mfg. Co. v. General Elec. Co., No. 4:90-CV-143,
1993 WL 725569, at *6 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (granting consultant's motion for sum-
mary judgment and holding consultant lacked "requisite relationship" with neigh-
bor sufficient to create any legal obligation).
7. See United States Ecology, Inc. v. Carlson, 638 F. Supp. 513, 515-16 (C.D.
Ill. 1986) (seeking to prevent company from being named on update to National
Priorities List by naming those waste disposal sites which present greatest danger to
public health or welfare). The defendant, United States Ecology, complained that
Ecology and Environment, Inc., an engineering firm hired by Illinois to evaluate a
site, owed it a duty to exercise due care in that evaluation. United States Ecology
argued that Ecology and Environment's failure to fulfill that duty lead to a loss of
their business reputation. See id. at 520. United States Ecology alleged that the
defendant breached its duty of care by relying on obsolete and inaccurate data and
by failing to visit the site. See id. The district court held that Ecology and Environ-
ment owed no duty to United States Ecology given that the loss of business reputa-
tion in the complaint was not reasonably foreseeable and would lead to undue
multiple defendant liability. See id. at 521.
8. See Grand Street Artists v. General Elec. Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 242, 244 (D.N.J.
1998). For a further discussion of Grand Street Artists, see infra notes 74-96 and ac-
companying text.
[Vol. X111: p. 235
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* A consultant hired to observe and document under-
ground tank excavation activities, to perform soil and
groundwater tests, to remediate soil and groundwater
contamination, and to prepare reports and work plans
to be filed with the state was sued by a purchaser of the
property for failing to discover all underground tanks
on the property.9
* A consultant hired by the government to identify envi-
ronmental contamination in a building, including
"readily accessible" asbestos, was sued by the building's
purchaser to whom the consultant gave a letter summa-
rizing the results of its inspection, provided at a cost of
only $200.10
" A group of individuals "residing near" the Rocky Moun-
tain Arsenal sued the government and Shell Oil Com-
pany for "personal injury and property damage as a
result of airborne pollutants released during the joint
cleanup effort at the Arsenal by Shell and the
Government.""'
" A purchaser of contaminated property (Lincoln) sued
the seller (Orsetti). Prior to the purchase, Lincoln's
consultant, Beta, stated that the property was "clear of
9. See Deangelo v. Exxon Corp., No. A-791-98T3, slip op. at 26 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Oct. 15, 1999) (holding consultant not liable given that contract for sale
was replete with disclaimers). Specifically, the court noted that the contract stated,
"[a] ny reliance ... on the report, or any information therein shall be at your own
risk. You should conduct your own investigation to determine the accuracy of the
report and the condition of the property." Id. For a further discussion of Deangelo,
see infra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
10. See Delaware County Redevelopment Auth. v. McLaren/Hart Envtl. Eng'g,
No. CIV. A. 97-3315, 1998 WL 181817, at *1, *5-*7 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (asserting both
tort and contract law claims). The court held that negligence claims would not be
allowed to go forward while the plaintiff could pursue breach of contract claims,
which the consultant did not contest. See id. at *7, *12.
11. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1530 (10th Cir. 1992). The
plaintiffs sought "response costs" from Shell and the government for medical mon-
itoring under § 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act [hereinafter CERCLA] as well as damages from Shell
under an "ultrahazardous activity" strict liability claim. See id. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit granted the government's motion to dismiss all of the
tort claims against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction insofar as the cleanup
activities fell under the discretionary function exception to their waiver of sover-
eign immunity. See id. at 1531. As to Shell's motions to dismiss, the court dis-
missed the CERCLA § 107(a) "response cost" claims, while denying dismissal of
the "ultrahazardous activity" strict liability claim. See id.
2002]
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contamination." Orsetti filed a negligence and fraud/
misrepresentation suit against Beta. 12
" A consultant hired to excavate and grade a portion of
land for a proposed housing development was sued for
Superfund contribution because it unknowingly spread
some of the contaminated soil over parts of the
property.1 3
" A person who conducted a pre-purchase soil investiga-
tion at a site was sued because, it was argued, the soil
testing was a "disposal" of hazardous substances suffi-
cient to trigger Superfund liability.14
* An engineering firm hired to prepare engineering plans
and drawings, to assist in obtaining permits, and to pro-
vide engineering and consulting services was sued as an
"operator" of a landfill. 15
This Article discusses the developing case law addressing the
liability of environmental consultants to third parties outside the
consulting contract. Although the laws of each state and among
federal circuits frequently differ and should be examined for the
controlling principles in a given case, some general trends are
emerging. Section II discusses one such trend, for example, the
potential for consultant liability under traditional common law
principles. Section III addresses the potential liability of consul-
tants under the federal Superfund statute. Finally, Section IV of
this Article suggests steps consultants can take to reduce their liabil-
ity and risk of loss.
II. COMMON LAw LIABILITY OF CONSULTANTS
A. The Critical Duty Analysis
The most important legal element that a plaintiff must estab-
lish in a suit against a consultant is the existence of a legal duty that
12. See Lincoln Alameda Creek v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 829 F. Supp. 325, 329-
30 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding consultant owed no legal duty to Orsetti and plaintiff
did not qualify as third party beneficiary under contract law claim). The court also
dismissed the fraud/misrepresentation claim because Orsetti did not fall within
the class of persons entitled to rely on the representations. See id. at 330.
13. See Kaiser Aluminum and Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d
1338, 133940 (9th Cir. 1992). For a further discussion of Kaiser Aluminum, see infra
notes 158-169 and accompanying text.
14. See United States v. CMDG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 711 (3d Cir. 1996).
For a further discussion of CDMG, see infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
15. City of N. Miami v. Berger, 828 F. Supp. 401,412-13 (E.D. Va. 1993) (find-
ing engineering firm did not qualify as "operator" given that they had no authority
to make final operational decisions).
4
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the consultant owed to the third party.' 6 The notion that a consult-
ant only owes a duty to someone with whom it directly contracts is
inaccurate insofar as the concept of privity, which traditionally lim-
ited a consultant's liability, no longer applies. 17 No bright-line stan-
dard exists for determining precisely when a consultant owes a duty
to a non-party to the contract. Judges decide, as a matter of law, the
issue as to whether or not a duty exists."' The key factor in such a
determination is the concept of foreseeability of injury.19
Foreseeability does not require a specific forecasting of particu-
larly identifiable victims or an accurate prediction of the exact
harm that may result from the conduct. 20 Instead, a party may be
liable to persons who normally and generally fall within a zone of
risk that the particular tortious conduct created. 2 1 Because almost
every occurrence is theoretically foreseeable, the existence of a duty
usually depends upon balancing fairness and public policy consid-
erations.2 2 One commentator noted:
Asking whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a "duty" is
simply another way of asking if the defendant ought to be
liable to the plaintiff for its negligence, and "foreseeabil-
ity" is merely a proxy for a policy determination about the
scope of liability in a particular case. Determining foresee-
16. See Monig v. Alfano, 254 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Mich. 1977). The general ele-
ments of a cause of action for negligence are the existence of a duty to the plain-
tiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant, legally cognizable harm to the plaintiff,
and causation between the defendant's negligent act and the harm. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
17. See generally FEINMAN, supra note 1, at § 3.1. The California Supreme
Court asserted that the "overwhelming weight of authority" supported the doctrine
that lack of privity bars an action for economic loss in a third-party case. See Buck-
ley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339 (1895).
18. See Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 86, 91 (Kan. 1983) (distinguishing ques-
tions of law from questions of fact in negligence actions).
19. See Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gileland, 677 P.2d 1292, 1295
(Ariz. 1984) (holding "[dluty and liability are only imposed where both the plain-
tiff and the risk are foreseeable to a reasonable person."); see also Mid-Western
Elec., Inc. v. DeWild Grant Reckert & Assoc. Co., 500 N.W.2d. 250, 254 (S.D. 1993)
(finding engineering firm liable).
20. See Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 517 (N.J. 1982) (defining "zone of
risk").
21. See id. (stating "a party will be liable to persons foreseeably exposed to
danger when the injury suffered was generally to be anticipated [even if] it was not
the exact injury that could have been predicted.").
22. See generally, Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) (discussing duty of
care to third party); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (holding
defendant auditor owed no general duty of care regarding conduct of audit to
persons other than client); Brooks v. Bank of Wisconsin Dells, 467 N.W.2d 187
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (finding in some situations, parties injured by negligent provi-
sion of professional services may sue professional regardless of privity).
2002] 239
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ability is always a judgment in hindsight about the degree
of concern that the defendant should have had for the
plaintiff s interests. 23
In First Federal S&L Ass'n of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., Inc.,24
the Connecticut Supreme Court stated:
Many harms are quite literally "foreseeable," yet for prag-
matic reasons, no recovery is allowed .... A further in-
quiry must be made, for we recognize that "duty" is not
sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law
to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection .... While
it may seem that there should be a remedy for every
wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by the realities of
this world. Every injury has ramifying consequences, like
the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for
the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a
controllable degree . . . . The final step in the duty in-
quiry, then, is to make a determination of the fundamen-
tal policy of the law, as to whether the defendant's
responsibility should extend to such results. 25
Then, in Giantonnio v. Taccard,26 the New Jersey Superior Court at-
tempted to sum up this cloudy area, stating:
[R]esolution of the question of whether a duty is owed
and to whom often involves no more than a value judg-
ment upon a factual complex rather than an evident appli-
cation of a precise rule of law. The ultimate
determination inevitably reflects the seasoning and experi-
ence of the one who judges.27
23. FEINMAN, supra note 1, at § 5.4.1. The fairness and policy analysis "in-
volves identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors - the relationship of the
parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise
care, and the public interest in the proposed solution." Carvalho v. Toll Bros. &
Developers, 675 A.2d 209, 212 (N.J. 1996) (citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors,
625 A.2d 1110, 1116 (N.J. 1993)). Courts recognize that foreseeability of harm
and consideration of fairness and policy are connected. Since foreseeability in-
volves an analysis of the magnitude and likelihood of potential harm, it is objec-
tively determinable. Conversely, the resolution of fairness and policy
considerations is a much less certain determination. See FEINMAN, supra note 1, at
§5.4.1.
24. 724 A.2d 497 (Conn. 1999).
25. Id. at 502 n.9 (quoting RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 650 A.2d 153
(Conn. 1994)).
26. 676 A.2d 1110 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996).
27. Id. at 1114 (noting court's reservation in finding duty of care).
6
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B. Traditional Case Law
Case law addressing consultant liability traditionally focused
more on the nature and scope of a consultant's undertaking rather
than fairness and policy considerations. The decision in Midwest
Aluminum Manufacturing Co. v. General Electric Co. 28 presents a good
example of the traditional, conservative approach some courts have
taken when considering a consultant's liability. In Midwest Alumi-
num, Midwest, a neighbor of General Electric (GE), alleged that
contamination at GE's property caused Midwest's business failure. 29
Midwest sued GE's consultant, Sirrine, alleging that Sirrine negli-
gently performed its investigation and fraudulently misrepresented
that Sirrine would fully and accurately study the contamination. 30
The court dismissed Midwest's claim, holding that "[t]here is no
legal requirement known to this Court - and none was brought to
the Court's attention - that an agent of one neighbor has a duty
owed to another neighbor without some sort of an affirmative ac-
tion taken by the agent."3'
Deangelo v. Exxon Corp.32 presents another example of tradi-
tional analysis of consultant liability.3 3 In Deangelo, Exxon hired
Handex, an environmental remediation company, to observe the
excavation of tanks and document ongoing tank removal activities
at a former gasoline station.34 Handex issued several reports to Ex-
xon, representing that all underground storage tanks had been re-
moved from the site.35 After the plaintiff, Deangelo, became
interested in the property, he asked Exxon for its environmental
28. Midwest Aluminum Mfg. Co. v. General Elec. Co., No. 4:90:CV-143, 1993 WL
725569, at *1 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
29. For a discussion of Midwest Aluminum, see supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
30. See id.
31. Id. at *6.
32. Deangelo v. Exxon Corp., No. A-791-98T3, slip op. at 26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Oct. 15, 1999).
33. For a discussion of Deangelo, see supra note 9 and accompanying text; see
also Lutz Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Industrial Louvers, Inc., 585 A.2d 631 (R.I. 1991) (hold-
ing that contractor's liability to third party does not extend beyond scope of its
contractual undertaking to its client).
34. See Deangelo, No. A-791-98T3, slip op. at 3 (discussing property owner's
discovery that underground tanks may have been leaking petroleum hydrocarbon
products and decision to hire subcontractor to remove tanks).
35. See id. at 6 (discussing relevant language in Remedial Action Workplan
that Handex prepared). Handex's Remedial Action Workplan specified that "[a ] 11
underground storage tanks, associated product piping, and product dispensers
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reports regarding the property cleanup. 36 Exxon turned over its
data on the site, including the reports Handex prepared.37 After
the plaintiff purchased the property, Handex found additional
tanks.3 8 The discovery delayed the plaintiffs use of the property
and prompted a lawsuit against Exxon and Handex.3 9 After the
jury returned a verdict against Exxon and Handex, the court
granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.40  The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the
decision. 41
In an action against Handex, Deangelo argued that Handex
negligently failed to discover all underground storage tanks at the
property.42 The court, however, rejected Deangelo's arguments.4
The court reviewed the evidence and determined that Handex was
not contractually bound to Exxon to identify all tanks.44 Thus, the
36. See id. at 4 (tracing sale process of two Exxon properties to Deangelo).
Deangelo purchased the Ridgewood property and deeded it to a corporation he
established for the purpose of operating an automobile repair facility on the site.
See id. at 8.
37. See id. at 4 (stating Deangelo requested any environmental reports regard-
ing cleanup of properties to determine whether sites were worth pursuing).
38. See id. at 8 (stating Handex employees discovered additional tanks while
conducting post-remediation soil borings).
39. See Deangelo, No. A-791-98T3, slip op. at 3 (claiming estimated damages of
$32,890.58, including interest on mortgage, taxes on property, insurance premi-
ums, and bill from remediation expert). Deangelo asserted that the discovery of
the additional tanks brought his development project to a standstill. See id. He
requested the Handex reports analyzing the soil samples taken during the first day
of excavation to determine whether the development of the property could pro-
ceed, but did not receive them until almost six months after the samples were
taken. See id. He asserted that, without the reports, he could not determine
whether further remediation of the property was necessary. See id.
40. See id. at 3 (discussing unanimous jury verdict finding defendant Exxon
80% liable for negligent misrepresentation, defendant Handex 15% liable for neg-
ligence, and plaintiffs 5% comparatively negligent).
41. See id. at 26.
42. See id. at 22 (arguing that Handex's report that all tanks had been re-
moved sufficiently demonstrated Handex's negligence). Plaintiffs emphasized
that Handex failed to take any measures to actually locate tanks, such as a
magnometer or digging test pits. Plaintiffs also asserted that Handex failed to look
for other tanks upon the discovery of the first unknown tank. Id. at 23.
43. See id. at 24 (stating specifically that Handex did not even owe duty to
investigate to Exxon).
44. See Deangelo, No. A-791-98T3, slip op. at 3. The court held that Exxon
proved that it retained Handex for the "limited purpose of observing and docu-
menting underground tank excavation activities, performing soil and groundwater
testing, remediating soil or groundwater contamination, and preparing reports
and workplans to be filed with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-
tection." Id. The court specified that none of Exxon's work orders to Handex
required it to detect or excavate underground tanks. See id.
8
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court reasoned, Handex owed no such duty to the plaintiff. Ac-
cording to the Deangelo court:
To place [the] requirement [to identify all tanks] on
Handex as a matter of law would have the practical effect
of forcing a party to a contract to enlarge the scope of its
work without compensation in order to protect itself
against the possibility of a negligence suit by some third
party. Aside from the fact that it would be unfair to im-
pose such a duty on Handex, the relationship between the
parties evidences no practical need to do so as a matter or
[sic] policy. 45
Moreover, Handex's statement that there were no other tanks at
the property was justifiably based upon the information Exxon pro-
vided to Handex. 46 In addition, it was important to the court that
Deangelo had hired his own expert who had the "means to avoid
the risk of reliance on Handex's work" but failed to do So.47 The
court stressed that Exxon's contract explicitly warned plaintiffs
against reliance upon Handex's report in view of the limited pur-
pose for which Handex was engaged to serve on the property.48
Sykes v. Prapane Power Corp.49 is another illustrative case employ-
ing a traditional analysis of consultant liability. In Sykes, a chemical
recovery plant hired Sullivan Engineering to assist in obtaining an
operating permit.50 In the course of its work, Sullivan prepared
drawings detailing the layout and location of the facilities involved
in the chemical recovery process, but it did not perform a safety
engineering evaluation of the process. 51 After an employee was
45. Id. at 25.
46. See id. at 24 (finding no maps provided by Exxon reflected tanks and cit-
ing undisputed testimony that presence of additional tanks "could not have been
discovered by careful, visual inspection of the site.").
47. Id. at 25-26 (emphasizing plaintiffs' expert's knowledge that tank was
found that had not previously appeared on any map provided by Exxon). The
court stated that there was nothing preventing plaintiffs or their expert from in-
quiring of Exxon what steps were being taken to determine the existence of other
tanks. See id. at 25. Further, the court suggested that if plaintiffs' expert was not
satisfied with Exxon's efforts, plaintiffs' contract permitted plaintiffs to inspect the
property for additional tanks. See id.
48. See id. (re-emphasizing the fact that Exxon did not hire Handex to under-
take an "exhaustive examination of the site to locate remaining underground
tanks.").
49. 541 A.2d 271 (N.J. Super. 1988).
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killed in an explosion, it was determined that the cause of the acci-
dent was a defect in the recovery process. 52
In affirming the grant of summary judgment to Sullivan, the
court focused on the "four corners" of Sullivan's contractual under-
taking.53 Sullivan was retained simply to prepare generalized draw-
ings of the processing system components in order to show how the
chemicals were carried, stored, and discharged.5 4 The court noted
that, "[g] iven the specific purpose for which Sullivan was hired, and
the limited scope of the order which he was required to follow in
preparing the documents... the trial court properly granted sum-
maryjudgment... -55 The court reasoned that "the need to fore-
see and prevent a particular risk of harm from materializing should
be commensurate with the degree of responsibility which the engi-
neer has agreed to undertake. '56
C. More Liberal Cases
The frequently cited court decision, Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc.,57
illustrates the reasoning applied in more liberal cases, holding con-
sultants liable for third party injuries. 58 In Caldwe, Bechtel con-
tracted to provide "safety engineering services" to a transit authority
and was sued by an equipment operator who allegedly contracted
silicosis because of the negligent performance of Bechtel's duties.59
Reversing the lower court decision, the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that Bechtel's liability
was not limited to the four corners of its contract.60 The court
stated, "[w]hile in contract law, only one to whom the contract
52. See id. at 273.
53. See id. at 275 (holding that, "given the specific purpose for which Sullivan
was hired, and the limited scope of the order which he was required to follow...
the trial court properly granted summary judgment .... ).
54. See Sykes, 541 A.2d at 275 (observing that Sullivan performed his obliga-
tions under contract and was not obligated to do anything more).
55. Id. (affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment).
56. Id. (linking need to foresee and prevent risk of harm with degree of con-
sultant's responsibility).
57. 631 F.2d 989, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
58. See id. (illustrating reasoning for holding consultants liable for third party
injuries).
59. See id. at 992-93 (noting reason for suit by an equipment operator). The
equipment operator alleged negligence by: 1) the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration [hereinafter OSHA]; 2) the National Loss Control Service Corpo-
ration [hereinafter NLCSC]; 3) Bechtel, Inc.; 4) International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local No. 77; and 5) the Shea - S&M-Ball joint venture. See id, at 993
n. 1. Appellant was awarded compensation for job incurred silicosis under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901. See id.
60. See id. at 1002-03 (noting extent of possible liability).
10
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specifies that a duty be rendered will have a cause of action for its
breach, in tort law, society, not the contract, specifies to whom the
duty is owed, and this has traditionally been the foreseeable plain-
tiff."6 1 In conclusion, the court stated:
[C]ourts have primarily premised an extension of liability
to the site architect [consultant/contractor] upon its con-
tractual undertaking on behalf of the project owner, and
upon the resultant foreseeability of injury to workers in
the event that the undertaking is negligently performed.
We endorse this interpretation of the interrelationship of
contractual duties owed to one party upon possible duty
and tort owed to another party .... 62
The North Carolina decision, Howell v. Fisher,63 is another ex-
ample of the liberal line of cases in this area. In Howell, the plain-
tiffs were individuals who invested in a corporation, relying upon a
soil testing report a consultant prepared for the company.64 After
the corporation became insolvent, the individuals sued the consult-
ant even though they were not in privity of contract.65 The court of
appeals reversed the lower court's decision and held that the case
could proceed against the consultant.66 The court of appeals be-
lieved that a jury could find it reasonably foreseeable that investors
would be damaged if the reports were incorrect.67 To support its
61. Id. at 998 (explaining difference between duty in contract law and duty in
tort law).
62. Id. at 999 (endorsing interpretation of contractual duties to one party and
tort duties to another); see also Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. O'Pry, 404 S.E.2d 299
(Ga. 1991). Here, the court held that a homeowner whose septic tank was improp-
erly installed had a cause of action against his builder's subcontractor who per-
formed percolation tests. See id.
63. 272 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
64. See id. at 21. Plaintiffs bought capital stock in Howell at a price of
$184,000.00 and loaned Howell $204,000.00. See id. After plaintiffs had invested,
Howell began mining the Hariet tract and soon discovered that the quality, quan-
tity, and value of the minerals did not meet the standards represented in defen-
dant's feasibility study. See id. at 22.
65. See id. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants were negligent in conducting the
soil tests and in providing incomplete and misleading information about the feasi-
bility and, potential value of the Hariet mining operation. See id. at 22.
66. See id. The court recognized an exception to the general rule that a stock-
holder cannot maintain an action in his own right against a third party for an
injury directly affecting him. See id. The exception applies when the injury to the
stockholder appears to have occurred because of a "violation of some special duty
owed the stockholder by the wrongdoer and having its origin in circumstances
independent of the plaintiffs status as a stockholder." Id.
67. See id. at 24. Plaintiffs did not have an action in contract because the
court reasoned that they did not stand to gain a benefit from the contract entered
into for soil testing services, which were solely for the corporation's benefit. See id.
2002] 245
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holding, the court relied on the plaintiffs allegations that the con-
sultant knew that the report had a specific purpose and target audi-
ence and that the report was intended to induce plaintiffs to act by
investing in the corporation.68
The question as to whether a court finds a duty to a third-party
from a consultant's contract may depend on whether the plaintiff
asserts a negligence action or a negligent misrepresentation action.
In Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland,69 the North
Carolina Supreme Court discussed the foreseeability standard used
in negligence actions and the standard followed in the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 552.70 The court noted that:
at 23. The court, however, held that plaintiffs complaint did allege a cause of
action based on defendant's negligence. See id.
68. See Howell, 272 S.E.2d at 25 (alleging sole purpose of report was to induce
plaintiffs to invest in corporation). In another noteworthy case, Carvahlo v. Toll
Bros. & Developers, the court performed a "multi-dimensional" analysis to deter-
mine whether the consultant owed a duty to a third party. See Carvahlo v. Toll Bros.
& Developers, 675 A.2d 209, 213 (N.J. 1996). In Carvahlo, the plaintiff's decedent
was killed when the walls of a trench in which he was working collapsed. See id. at
210-11. The plaintiff claimed that the project engineer hired the inspector, who
was present when the accident occurred, to observe the work performed and to
monitor the progress of the work. See id. The plaintiff argued the inspector had a
duty to supervise safety procedures of the construction. See id. at 212. The court
framed the legal issue as whether the engineer had a legal duty to exercise reason-
able care for the safety of workers when the engineer had a contractual responsi-
bility for the progress of the work, but not for the safety conditions, yet was aware
of working conditions at the site that created a risk of serious injury to workers. See
id. at 211. In holding that summary judgment should not have been granted to
the consultant, the court was plainly swayed by "considerations of fairness and pol-
icy" and "its value judgment, based on an analysis of public policy." Id at 214-15.
Even though the consultant was not hired to assess safety concerns, the court
noted that the consultant was at the site everyday and there was "an overlap of
work-progress considerations and work-safety concerns." Id. at 211, 213. In doing
a "fairness" analysis the court also focused on the fact that the consultant had the
authority to take or require corrective measures if safety concerns affected the pro-
gress of the work, and the consultant was aware of the risk of harm. See id. at 211.
"The existence of actual knowledge of an unsafe condition can be extremely im-
portant in considering the fairness in imposing a duty of care." Id. at 214. The
court stated that "the engineer had the opportunity and was in a position to fore-
see and discover the risk of harm and to exercise reasonable care to avert any
harm." Id. at 215. In addition, the NewJersey Supreme Court reasoned that the
"financial arrangements and understanding [between the consultant and its cli-
ent] do not overcome the public policy that imposes a duty of care and ascribes
liability to the engineer in these circumstances." Id.; see also Vogan v. Hayes Ap-
praisal Assoc., Inc., 588 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1999) (holding appraiser hired by
bank/mortgagee to monitor progress of new home construction is liable to home
owner for its negligence after builder defaulted).
69. 367 S.E.2d 609.
70. See id. at 609-10 (N.C. 1988) (discussing foreseeability standard used in
negligence actions).
12
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[Section 552] prevents extension of liability in situations
where the . . . [consultant] 'merely knows of the ever-pre-
sent possibility of action in reliance upon [the audit re-
port], on the part of anyone to whom it may be repeated.'
As such, it balances, more so than the other standards, the
need to hold ... [consultants] to a standard that accounts
for their contemporary role in the financial world with the
need to protect them from liability that unreasonably ex-
ceeds the bounds of their real undertaking. 71
In addition, commentators have discussed the differences between
the two actions, stating:
First, the misrepresentation action specifically requires
that the third party rely on the defendant's misrepresenta-
tion, while the negligence action does not contain that
specific requirement. Second, the misrepresentation ac-
tion as stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section 552(2)
contains specific limitations on the third parties to whom
a duty is owed and the type of transaction for which harm
suffered is legally cognizable.7 2
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the differences between the two
causes of action are not terribly significant because the elements of
negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims generally are
applied in the same manner.73
A more troubling decision for environmental consultants is the
New Jersey federal court holding in Grand Street Artists v. General
Electric Company 4 The Grand Street Artists decision illustrates a clear
example of the principle that "tort liability can be adapted to ad-
dress areas in which recognition of a cause of action and the impo-
sition of a duty of care are both novel and controversial. '75 In
Grand Street Artists, Quality Tool & Die Company (Quality) triggered
71. Id. at 617 (defining limits of liability). Nevertheless, other courts have
noted the similarity between negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims.
See Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1563 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting similarities).
"[W]e have great difficulty both in holding them apart in our minds and in under-
standing why the parties are quarreling over the exact characterization." Id.; see also
H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
72. FINEMAN, supra note 1, at § 5.2.
73. Id. at 48-49 (holding "[a]s a practical matter, the reliance requirement
often is subsumed within the negligence action's requirement of a causal link be-
tween the breach of duty and the harm; only by relying on the information can the
third party suffer harm as a result of the defendant's communication.").
74. 19 F. Supp. 2d 242 (D.N.J. 1998).




Schneider: The Expanding Liability of Environmental Consultants to Third Par
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
248 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XIII: p. 235
New Jersey's property transfer cleanup statute, the Environmental
Clean Up Responsibility Act (ECRA), by ceasing its operations.76 A
year later, Quality hired Jenny Engineering (Jenny) to assist with
ECRA compliance issues.77 Jenny's undertaking was specifically de-
fined in writing and was based on the accuracy of statements from
the owner concerning the site conditions and history of opera-
tions.78 Jenny made no mention of mercury contamination in the
report it filed with the State. 79 Thereafter, Grand Street Artists
(GSA) investigated whether to buy the property and hired its own
consultant to do a "Due Diligence Pre-Purchase." 80 This consult-
ant, REM, reviewed Quality's ECRA case file and concluded that the
level of contamination met current "Cleanup Standards." 8' Quality
then sold the property to GSA, which intended to develop "custom-
ized urban homes."82 Several years later mercury contamination
was discovered on the property.83
GSA sued numerous parties, including Jenny, arguing that
Jenny's ECRA submissions were "materially false and misleading"
because the submissions failed to identify any mercury contamina-
tion. 84 Jenny asserted that it owed no duty to prospective purchas-
ers.85 The court framed the legal issue as "whether a defendant/
environmental consultant who provides ECRA assistance to an
owner who wishes to cease operations owes a duty to a plaintiff who
76. See Grand Street Artists, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
77. See id. at 245 (stating that Quality hiredJenny for "technical assistance" in
ECRA process).
78. See id. Jenny expressed concern over possible legal liability given that
Quality's decision to comply with ECRA came more than one year after shutdown.
See id. Thus, Jenny notified Quality that the statements would be based on the
accuracy of their statements and known history of operations. See id.
79. See id. at 246 (examining argument that Jenny's failure to discover mer-
cury breached duty of care to plaintiffs).
80. See id. "This 'Due Diligence Pre-Purchase' involved an examination of the
premises to determine whether they could be safely converted to residential use."
Id.
81. See Grand Street Artists, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 246. Accordingly, "REM advised
GSA that the property was suitable for development as a residential project." Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. After mercury was discovered in 1996, the DEP rescinded its ap-
proval, which prompted GSA to bring suit. See id.
84. See id. Plaintiffs contended that "Jenny breached a 'duty of due care'
which it owed to plaintiffs by failing to conduct its environmental audit.., in an
independent manner and in accordance with generally accepted standards .... "
Id.
85. See id. at 246-47. Jenny asserted that they merely provided assistance to
Quality in facilitating its "cessation of operations" under ECRA, and thus, owed no
duty to prospective purchasers. Id. "Additionally, it argues that because it did not
have a duty, it cannot be held liable for contribution or indemnification." Id.
14
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has relied upon a review of the owner's ECRA submissions in mak-
ing the decision to purchase the premises and convert them for
residential use."86
In actuality, the court addressed the scope of a consultant's lia-
bility when it files reports available for public inspection. 87 The
court held that Jenny could have foreseen that real estate purchas-
ers would rely on its reports.88 The court stated that "ECRA submis-
sions are public filings which were easily accessible to prospective
purchasers. Thus, it was foreseeable that a potential purchaser
would look to the prior ECRA submissions in considering whether
to enter into the transaction."89 According to the court, the fact
that the property was not for sale when Jenny did its work and that
GSA did not know plaintiff intended to buy the property was not
determinative.90
Further, the court rejcted Jenny's fairness and policy argu-
ments.91 The court reasoned that Jenny's liability was not limitless
because the plaintiffs in the case purchased the premises and were
not "remote."92 The court also did not credit Jenny's argument
that it was being exposed to significant liability. 93 The court stated
that the fact that "the magnitude of the liability may be great does
not by itself provide enough of a reason for not finding a duty. En-
vironmental harm is often substantial."94 Indeed, the court rea-
soned that two factors favored imposing a duty. First, "the public
has an interest in the proper compliance with ECRA to protect it
against hazardous waste."95 Second, there was some indication in
86. Grand Street Artists, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 247.
87. See id. at 250.
88. See id. (stating that " [f] rom the structure of ECRA, Jenny should have




91. See Grand Street Artists, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 251 (noting that Jenny raised a
number of fairness and policy arguments). Jenny "argues that by finding a duty to
'remote and future purchasers,' the court will 'affect an equally inefficient alloca-
tion of professional responsibilities.'" Id. This would expose environmental con-
sultants to "unlimited class of plaintiffs and limitless liability." Id.
92. See id. (responding to Jenny's fairness and policy argument).
93. See id. (noting that even though liability may be great environmental harm
is also substantial in this situation).
94. Id. at 251-52.
95. Id. at 252.
2002]
15
Schneider: The Expanding Liability of Environmental Consultants to Third Par
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
250 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XIII: p. 235
the record that Jenny knew that the premises would be sold once
the ECRA process was complete. 96
Although the Grand Street Artists decision will undoubtedly in-
crease the exposure of consultants to liability, its bounds are lim-
ited. For example, courts often literally interpret non-reliance
clauses in a contract.97 In Bronstein v. GZA Geoenvironmental, Inc.,
the plaintiff contracted to purchase property and hired. GZA to con-
duct an environmental survey.98 After GZA completed work on the
survey, Bronstein assigned his rights to plaintiffs, Samuel Bronstein,
James Fokas and Herbert Miller (BFM plaintiffs), who purchased
the property.99 After the sale, hazardous waste contamination was
discovered on the property and the owners sued GZA. 100 The court
affirmed the dismissal of GZA and held that GZA owed no duty to
the BFM plaintiffs. 10 1 The court based its decision on the language
in the contract between GZA and Bronstein and the affirmative
steps GZA took to limit reliance by others upon its work.102 GZA
wisely stated in writing that its report was prepared "for the exclu-
sive use of [Bronstein]."103 Further, the dissemination of the report
was prohibited "without the prior written consent of GZA."' 0 4
Based on the limiting language in GZA's report, the court found
that it was not reasonably foreseeable that Bronstein would furnish
the information to the BFM plaintiffs, or that the BFM plaintiffs
96. See Grand Street Artists, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 252 (noting that former Jenny
geologist stated "that it was his 'understanding' that after the ECRA process was
completed, [Quality] would sell the premises.").
97. See Bronstein v. GZA Geoenvironmental, Inc., 665 A.2d 369, 372 (N.H. 1995)
(holding it was not foreseeable that Bronstein would furnish report to other par-
ties without consent of GSA). For further discussion of Bronstein, see supra note 5
and accompanying text.
98. See Bronstein, 665 A.2d at 370 (noting that GZA completed project before
Bronstein assigned his rights to plaintiffs).
99. See id. (noting that plaintiffs then entered into option agreement with
James C. Cooney Jr. for sale of property).
100. See id. at 371 (stating environmental firm that Cooney hired found haz-
ardous waste contamination on property and Cooney declined to go forward with
sale).
101. See id. at 372 (stating holding of court that GZA owed no duty of care to
BFM).
102. See id. (discussing non-reliance provisions in contract between GZA and
Bronstein).
103. Bronstein, 665 A.2d at 372.
104. Id. (stating that dissemination beyond reporting to lender and title in-
surer was not allowed without GZA's consent).
16
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would rely on the report.10 5 Therefore, according to the court,
GZA owed no duty of care to the BFM plaintiffs. 10 6
Despite these court decisions, consultants should not be lulled
into believing that courts systematically enforce contractual limita-
tion of liability clauses. For example, in State Farm v. HHS Associates,
Inc.,10 7 State Farm purchased property from HHS that was later dis-
covered to be contaminated. 10 8 State Farm sued HHS's consultant,
SMC, alleging that SMC negligently failed to discover that petro-
chemicals were present. 10 9 SMC moved to dismiss the claim and
argued that its contract with HHS specifically repudiated any third
party reliance on its contract.110 Further, SMC argued that State
Farm had no greater rights under the contract than HHS; HHS
105. See id. The court determined that since the report itself contained the
express limitation on dissemination, the lender was aware of the limitation. See id.
"Additionally, it would not be reasonably foreseeable that information supplied to
a lender by a potential purchaser would be transmitted by that lender to other
purchasers." Id.
106. Id.; see also generally R-1 Associates, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Associates,
Inc., 1995 WL 517554 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 1995) (holding that GZA should be granted
partial summary judgment for limitation of liability provision); Goldstein v.
Wausau Ins. Co., et al., No. SOM-L-2262-96, slip op. at 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.,
Nov. 5, 1999) (refusing to extend Grand Street Artists decision to inappropriate
lengths). In Goldstein, the court granted summary judgment to defendant consult-
ant, McLaren/Hart Environmental Engineering Corporation on plaintiff Gold-
stein's claims of fraudulent concealment, gross negligence/reckless indifference
and negligence. See id. at 2. The original property owner hired McLaren/Hart to
investigate contamination at a site and prepared several reports that were submit-
ted to the DEP. See id. Before buying the property, Goldstein hired his own expert
who deemed McLaren/Hart's work incomplete and inadequate. See id. Thereaf-
ter, Goldstein bought the property anyway and worked with his expert to obtain
ECRA clearance. See id. After several years of work at the site, significant TCE
contamination was found and Goldstein sued McLaren/Hart. See id. The court
granted McLaren/Hart's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that although
a duty could exist under Grand Street Artists because it is foreseeable that prospec-
tive purchasers would rely upon prior environmental reports in considering
whether to purchase the property, none was owed to Goldstein under these facts.
See id. The court held:
Thus, Plaintiff would have this Court accept the assertion that a reasona-
bly foreseeable plaintiff is one who relies upon a sampling plan that he or
she finds to be both incomplete and inadequate in choosing to purchase
property. Such an assertion is not the holding in Grand Street Artists, nor
is it one this Court is willing to accept.
Id. at 3.
107. 1995 WL 739703, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
108. Id. at *1 (noting that HHS hired consultant, SMC, who found petro-
chemicals present in soil).
109. See id. (establishing presence of petrochemicals in soil that SMC failed to
fully discover).
110. See id. The contract included a provision specifically disclaiming any
third party rights, expressly stating, "[N] othing contained in this agreement shall
create a contractual relationship with or cause of action in favor of any third party
against either [HHS] or [SMC]." Id.
2002]
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agreed to indemnify SMC.111 Despite this language, the court per-
mitted the case to go forward and held that "the obligations of an
intended third-party beneficiary [State Farm] are [not] ... identi-
cal to those [of] the contracting parties." 112 Thus, despite the limit-
ing language in SMC's contract, if the jury decided that the
contracting parties intended to benefit State Farm, SMC could be
liable to State Farm.1 13
In Woodward-Gizienski & Associates v. Geotechnical Exploration,
Inc.,' 14 the developers of a condominium project brought a negli-
gence and equitable indemnity action against soil engineers hired
by homeowners in the project. 115 The homeowners hired the engi-
neers to investigate the site and make recommendations to cure
defects and damage arising from settlement of balconies, buildings
and pools.116 The homeowners relied on the engineers' recom-
mendation in making their repairs. 117 After the developers settled
with the homeowners, the developers sued the forensic soil engi-
neers alleging that they negligently caused the homeowners to
make excessive repairs to their property.1 18 The lower court dis-
missed the case and the decision was affirmed on appeal.1 19 The
court held that the developers had no legal basis to assert the exis-
tence of damage and could not state a cause of action against the
homeowner's consultant. 120
III. SUPERFUND LIABILITIES OF CONSULTANTS
Consultants face substantial third-party liability under
Superfund if they do not properly perform their work. In New Cas-
tle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp.,121 EPA hired Halliburton NUS
Corporation (NUS) to perform a Remedial Investigation/Feasibil-
ity Study (RI/FS) at the Tybout's Corner Landfill Site. 122 The
111. See id. at *2 (holding SMC's argument to be without merit).
112. State Farm v. HHS Associates, Inc., 1995 WL 739703, at *2.
113. Id. at *4 (describing standard to be applied).
114. 208 Cal. App. 3d 64 (1989) (noting reliance of third party).
115. Id. at 66 (tracing procedural background).
116. See id. (outlining duties of engineering firm).
117. See id. (noting justified reliance by third party on professional opinion).
118. See id. at 66-67 (claiming breach of duty of professional care).
119. See Woodward-Gizienski, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 64.
120. See id. at 67-68 (holding developers had no claim against engineers
under doctrine of equitable indemnification).
121. 903 F. Supp. 771 (Del. 1995), affd in part, 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997)
(illustrating consultant liability in Superfund context).
122. Id. at 773. The purpose of the study was to determine the presence of
the Merchantville Formation in relation to the Columbia Sand and the Potomac
Sand. See id. The Merchantville Formation is a layer of clay that separates the
18
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol13/iss2/2
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS
county sued NUS, alleging that NUS negligently installed a well that
contributed to the contamination at the site. 123 The court ruled
that NUS could be liable to the county under section 9619 (a) of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA).1 24 Section 9619(a) provides that
A person who is a response action contractor with respect
to any release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance . . . shall not be liable under this subchapter or
under any other Federal law to any person for injuries,
costs, damages, expenses, or other liability (including but
not limited to claims for indemnification or contribution
and claims by third parties for death, personal injury, ill-
ness or loss of or damage to property or economic loss)
which results from such release or threatened release. 125
The court held that a response action contractor is liable to "any
other person" who is harmed by the contractor's negligence.'
26
The court reasoned that the phrase "any other person" is broad and
includes third-party potentially responsible parties (PRPs), such as
the plaintiff, New Castle County.127
The saving grace afforded to response action contractors pur-
suant to section 9619(a) is that they are held to a negligence, rather
than a strict liability, standard of liability.' 28 However, if a consult-
ant does not perform services for the government, the consultant
cannot rely upon section 9619 as a shield. 129 Therefore, consul-
tants who undertake work at a contaminated site may expose them-
polluted Columbia Sand and the underlying formation known as the Potomac
Sand that serves as the major drinking water source for residents of New Castle
County, Delaware. See id.
123. See id. (claiming improperly drilled well resulted in opening in
Merchantville formation that allowed pollution to flow into Potomac Sand).
124. See id. at 775 (refusing to apply public duty doctrine).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 9619(e) (2) (2002) (clarifying liability of response action
contractor as opposed to liability of responsible parties). Section 9619(e) (2) fur-
ther provides that this section "shall not apply in the case of a release that is caused
by conduct of the response action contractor which is negligent, grossly negligent,
or which constitutes intentional misconduct." Id.
126. See New Castle County, 903 F. Supp. at 775 (stating response action con-
tractor is liable under § 9619 given finding of contractor's negligence, gross negli-
gence or intentional misconduct).
127. See id. (refusing to limit phrase "any other person" and provide protec-
tion to defendant).
128. See id. (explaining that prior tQ enactment of§ 9619 response action con-
tractors were held to strict liability standard).
129. See id. at 775 (recognizing limitations of § 9619 protection).
2002]
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selves to significant Superfund liability, which is strict, joint and
several.130
For example, in K. C. 1986 Limited Partnership v. Reade Manufac-
turing,131 a consultant, Terracon, installed wells at a contaminated
site to induce a prospective purchaser to buy the property.132 Sub-
sequently, significant contamination was found on the site and the
owner sued Terracon, and argued that Terracon's installation of
monitoring wells contributed to the contamination on the site. 133
The court held that Terracon could be liable under CERCLA sec-
tion 9607 (a) (2) as a person who "disposed" of hazardous wastes at
the site because disposal is not limited to the original introduction
of a hazardous material to a site.134 The court refused to immunize
a consultant who performed pre-acquisition soil testing from CER-
CLA liability.13 5
When Congress wished to relax the strict liability standard
of CERCLA, it expressly did so. CERCLA has a specific
section for persons providing care and advice during
cleanup and no reference is made to environmental test-
ing. 42 U.S.C. §9607(d). Nor were environmental investi-
gators given any protection in 42 U.S.C. §9619 which
limits the liability of response action contractors who are
working for the government or are working for a private
responsible party under the supervision of the govern-
ment. Nor did Congress create a special defense for envi-
ronmental testers.136
130. See id. at 776 (outlining CERCLA liability).
131. 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
132. Id. at 1146 (revealing site had been used for manufacturing, blending
and storing of herbicides).
133. See id. (claiming wells drilled as part of pre-acquisition environmental
investigation caused arsenic and other contaminants to flow "from the more highly
contaminated clay into the less contaminated underlying sand aquifer."). The
consultant argued that the wells had been constructed "in accordance with the
standard of care" that existed in the Greater Kansas City area in 1989. See id. at
1147.
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2) (2002). Section 9607(a) (2) identifies as par-
ties that could be liable for contamination "any person who at the time of disposal
of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility which such hazardous
substances were disposed of. . . ." Id.
135. See KC. Partnership, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (asserting that there is express
language in CERCLA to support court's holding).
136. Id. (providing specific examples of statutes containing express language
supporting theory that consultants who undertake work at contamination site
could expose themselves to liability).
20
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Geraghty & Miller,
Inc. v. Conoco, Inc.,137 also addressed the liability of a consultant as
an arranger for disposal of hazardous substances. In Geraghty &
Miller, Conoco, Inc. (Conoco) hired Geraghty & Miller (G&M) "to
assess possible contamination beneath several suspected [pollu-
tion] source areas" on Conoco's property.138 G&M agreed to pre-
pare design specifications for the installation of groundwater
monitoring wells, to install the wells, and to sample the wells. 139
Once the work was completed, Conoco suspected that the wells
were installed improperly and the deficiencies aggravated existing
contamination.1 40 Despite Conoco's claims that G&M was liable
under CERCLA, the court granted G&M's motion for summary
judgment.14 '
Ultimately, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision. 142
According to the Fifth Circuit, no bright-line test exists for deter-
mining when a consultant is an arranger within the meaning of
CERCLA.143 The court rejected a narrow interpretation of the
term "disposal," thereby "leaving open the possibility that one who
moves hazardous waste intra-site can be held liable as an ar-
ranger. ' 144 Even though G&M had not brought hazardous sub-
stances to the site, if the consultant "caused waste to be dispersed
across the site it would be subject to arranger liability."1 45 Nonethe-
less, to impose liability, there must "be a nexus that allows someone
137. 234 F.3d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 2000), reh'g denied, 247 F.3d 243, cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 2592 (2001) (stating that both soil and groundwater had been contami-
nated by ethylene dichloride).
138. See id. (satisfying requirements of Louisiana Department of Environmen-
tal Quality pursuant to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6922(k) (1994) [hereinafter RCRA]).
139. See id. at 921 (explaining Geraghty & Miller [hereinafter G&M] installed
fifty monitoring wells and monitored them for one year).
140. See id. (explaining Plaintiffs uncovered physical evidence that showed at
least four wells had not been installed according to contract specification).
141. See Geraghty & Miller, 234 F.3d at 922. Conoco filed a counterclaim seek-
ing relief under CERCLA §§ 107 and 113. See id.
142. See id. at 927-29. The district court granted G&M's motion for summary
judgment on several grounds, including the claim that G&M did not meet CER-
CLA's definition of covered persons because G&M did not operate, arrange or
transport hazardous materials and because the claim was time barred. See id. at
921.
143. See id. at 929 (explaining that because CERCLA does not define "ar-
ranged for," court looked to "definition and interpretation of 'disposal' for assis-
tance in deciding if one is an arranger.").
144. Id. (citing Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849
F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding circuit's previous rejection).
145. Id. (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Wood Indus., Inc., 815 F. Supp.
1384, 1392 (E.D. Wash. 1993)).
20021
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to be labeled as an arranger."146 The nexus is "the obligation to ex-
ercise control over hazardous waste disposal, and not the mere abil-
ity or opportunity to control the disposal." 147 The court also ruled
that the "totality of the circumstances" must be taken into account
to determine if arranger liability should be imposed.1 48
The court, in Geraghty & Miller, also discussed the liability of a
consultant who installs monitoring wells as an operator. 149 Address-
ing this issue, the court held that a consultant could be liable as an
"operator" of a site at which it worked so long as there is "some
nexus between that person's or entity's control and the hazardous
waste contained in the facility. ' 150 The nexus necessary to establish
"operator" liability turns on a determination as to whether the con-
sultant had authority to control the cause of the contamination at
the time the hazardous substances were released into the environ-
ment. 5 1 Under this analysis, the "totality of the circumstances con-
cerning . . . [the consultant's] involvement at the site" must be
analyzed to determine if operator liability attaches.1 52 Factors rele-
vant to operator liability include the consultant's control over the
placement, design and installation of the wells, including the selec-
tion and supervision of the subcontractor who performed the ac-
tual installation, and whether the consultant merely gave advice
and expertise to the project ultimately controlled by the owner.1 53
Other factors to examine include the owner's technical expertise,
its supervision of the work, and the relative authority of the parties
at the worksite.' 54
The court, in K C. Partnership, also held that a consultant could
be liable as an "operator" under CERCLA section 9607(a) (2). 1 5
To determine the issue as to whether Terracon was liable as an op-
146. Geraghty & Miller, 234 F.3d at 929 (recognizing nexus must exist for ar-
ranger, as it must exist for operator, before liability will attach).
147. Id. (quoting General Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d
281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original) (stating that control over substance
makes one liable as arranger).
148. See id. at 928 (stating that control is one aspect of test).
149. Id. (referencing to case law because CERCLA provides little guidance).
150. Id.
151. See Geraghty & Miller, 234 F.3d at 928 (finding entity cannot be deemed
to be operator without control).
152. Id.
153. See id. at 929 (stating totality of circumstances should take into considera-
tion each of these factors).
154. See id. (stating that Conoco and G&M disagree on expertise level).
155. See United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994). A person
is an "operator" under section 9607 (a) (2) of CERCLA if he or she: (1) had author-
ity to determine whether hazardous waste would be disposed of and the method of
disposal and (2) actually exercised that authority, either by personally performing
22
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erator, the court examined whether a disposal occurred during the
consultant's activity at the site and whether Terracon "had authority
to determine whether and how hazardous waste would be disposed
of and exercised that authority during its involvement with the
site."1 56 Because Terracon was specifically retained to determine
the environmental status of the site, prepared a plan to investigate
the site, had access to the site and decided how and where to install
the monitoring wells at issue, the court found that a question of fact
existed as to whether Terracon was an operator. 157
In another noteworthy Superfund case, Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. v. Catellus Development Corp.,158 Catellus Development
sought contribution from Ferry, the consultant, for the cost of
cleaning up a contaminated site.1 59 Catellus Development's prede-
cessor hired Ferry to excavate and grade a portion of the land for a
proposed housing development. 160 While excavating the develop-
ment site, Ferry spread some of the displaced soil over other parts
of the property. 161 Catellus claimed that Ferry exacerbated the ex-
tent of the contamination by spreading contaminated soil over
clean areas of the property.1 62 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided that Catellus could be liable under CERCLA.163 The court
added that Ferry could be liable as an "operator" if it "had authority
to control the cause of the contamination at the time the hazardous
substances were released into the environment.1 64 The court
found that Ferry "disposed of" hazardous substances because the
term includes "the dispersal of contaminated soil during the exca-
vation and grading of a development site."165
the task necessary to dispose of the hazardous waste or by directing others to per-
form those tasks. See id.
156. K.C. 1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg. , 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1153 (1998)
(revealing nature of Terracon's involvement but not extent of its involvement at
issue).
157. See id. at 1154 (finding summary judgment inappropriate).
158. 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992).




163. See Kaiser Aluminum, 976 F.2d at 1341 (stating Catellus' allegation is suffi-
cient to state claim under §§ 9607(a) (2) and 9607(a) (4)).
164. Id. (finding control of day to day operation of plant during release of
hazardous substance is essential to operator liability).
165. Id. at 1342 (holding removal of tainted soil and spreading it over un-
tainted soil constitutes "dispersal").
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The Ninth Circuit further held that Ferry could be liable as a
"transporter" under CERCLA section 9607(a) (4).166 Since CER-
CLA defines "transportation" as "the movement of a hazardous sub-
stance by any mode ... " Ferry could be a transporter because it
necessarily moved the contaminated soil when it excavated and
graded the property.1 67 The court ruled that the movement of con-
taminated soils on-site could subject a consultant to CERCLA liabil-
ity. 168 The court reasoned that "[t]here is no logical basis for a
defendant's liability as a 'transporter' under section 9607(a) (4) to
hinge solely on whether he moves hazardous substances across a
recognized property boundary."169
The Kaiser Aluminum decision is consistent with the Fifth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas,
Inc.170 The Fifth Circuit, in Tanglewood, held that a consultant who
dispersed contaminated soil during the construction of a housing
subdivision could be strictly liable under CERCLA as a person who
arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances. 171 The
court reasoned that, "since disposal may be merely the 'placing of
166. See id. at 1343 (discussing liability under § 9607(a)(4)). Section
9607(a)(4) imposes liability on any person who "accepted any hazardous sub-
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release,
which causes the occurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance .... " Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (1995)).
167. Kaiser Aluminum, 976 F.2d at 1343 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (26) (2001)
(noting that Ferry was potential transporter pursuant to language in CERCLA).
168. See Kaiser Aluminum, 976 F.2d at 1343 (noting that hazardous material
does not have to be conveyed to separate parcel of land to incur liability under
CERCLA § 9607(a) (4)).
169. Id. The Ninth Circuit continued:
We conclude that liability may be imposed under section 9607 (a) (4) for
transporting hazardous material to an uncontaminated area of property,
regardless of whether the material was conveyed to a separate parcel of
land. Catellus's allegations that Ferry excavated the contaminated soil
from one area of the property and moved it to another are sufficient to
allege potential liability predicated upon 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (4).
Id.
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit, in Geraghty & Miller, refused to impose transporter
liability on a consultant. See Geraghty & Miller, 234 F.3d at 929 (discussing liability
as transporter of hazardous waste). The Tenth Circuit reasoned that even if the
consultant's conduct resulted in the unintended migration of a hazardous sub-
stance, there still must be evidence that the contractor moved the hazardous sub-
stance to "another facility or site." Id. (noting that evidence of intent to transport
hazardous waste is needed to incur liability).
170. Compare Kaiser Aluminum, 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992), with Tanglewood
E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., et al., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988) (address-
ing "arranger" liability in context of construction cases).
171. See Tanglewood, 849 F.2d at 1573-74 (discussing previous court decision
not to dismiss complaint for failure to state claim upon which relief under CER-
CIA may be granted).
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any... hazardous waste into or on any land... ,' those who move
the waste about the site may fall within the terms of the
provision. 172
The foregoing decisions, however, conflict with United States v.
CDMG Realty Co.173 In CDMG, the purchaser of contaminated prop-
erty sought contribution from Dowel Associates (Dowel), arguing
that a soil investigation conducted by Dowel spread contamination
at the site. 174 The Third Circuit agreed that a soil investigation
could constitute a disposal under CERCLA. 175 Nevertheless, unlike
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit, in CDMG, refused to
hold the consultant strictly liable.1 76 The court held that the con-
sultant could only be liable if the plaintiff proved that the soil inves-
tigation was negligent.1 77 The court stated that "it is not enough
for plaintiff to show that a soil investigation has caused the spread
of contaminants. Rather, we conclude that in order to establish
that 'disposal' has occurred based on a soil investigation, a plaintiff
must also show that the investigation was conducted negligently."178
The Third Circuit reasoned that if a person was strictly liable
for the spreading of contaminants during a soil investigation, such
liability would discourage pre-purchase due diligence. 179 There-
fore, the Third Circuit differs from other circuits because it inter-
posed a negligence standard which, in its view, "harmonize[d]
CERCLA's clear intention to allow soil investigations and its goal of
remedying hazardous waste sites." 180
172. Id. at 1573 (discussing potential liability under CERCLA for those who
merely move waste about site).
173. 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996).
174. See id. at 710.
175. See id. at 719 (noting that dispersal of contaminants could constitute dis-
posal). It was not significant to the court that the disturbance at issue was de
minimis. See id. "The dispersal of contaminants need not reach a particular thresh-
old level in order to constitute 'disposal'.... There is no exception for de minimis
disturbances." Id. Further, the court noted that "the fact that a defendant's dis-
persal of contaminants is trivial may provide a ground to allocate less liability to
that defendant, but it is not a defense to liability." Id. (emphasis omitted).
176. See id. at 720-21 (noting that strict liability does not apply here because
this is not ordinary case).
177. See id. at 722 (discussing plaintiffs burden in order to demonstrate "dis-
posal" has occurred).
178. CDMG, 96 F.3d at 721 (discussing what plaintiff must prove to demon-
strate liability).
179. See id. (asserting that pre-purchase due diligence entails appropriate in-
quiry and appropriate soil investigation).
180. Id. at 722 (discussing reasoning for applying negligence standard).
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IV. SUGGESTED PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR CONSULTANTS
Recent case law, including the decisions highlighted in this Ar-
ticle, require individuals and companies involved in the environ-
mental consulting business to take proactive steps to protect
themselves. Consultants must evaluate their liability exposure and
make informed judgments as to whether it is worthwhile, or profita-
ble, to undertake a project in the face of the potential risks.
In order to protect themselves, consultants should take the crit-
ical step to re-examine standard language in contracts to assure that
the terms and provisions accurately reflect the scope of services the
consultant agrees to undertake. Key contract terms should be spe-
cifically defined. In addition, consultants should ensure that their
contracts plainly and clearly delineate the scope of their undertak-
ing. There should be standard procedures for modifications to the
scope of work. Furthermore, all changes to the scope of work
should be put in writing.
The body of the consultant's report should document that the
work or report is done only for the benefit of the contracting party.
The report should also include a written understanding of the pur-
pose of the work and for whom it is designed to benefit. Contracts
should include no reliance clauses and explicit statements that the
report is only prepared for the benefit of the contracting parties
and that reliance by anyone else is not authorized. In addition, the
consultant should contractually limit the client's right to distribute
its report and specifically tailor indemnity provisions to the work at
issue instead of using boilerplate language.
Further, it is important to include confidentiality provisions in
contracts so that the dissemination of information in reports is lim-
ited.181 If a consultant obtains information and data from a client
or third party, such disclosure should be specifically mentioned.
The consultant should not vouch for the accuracy of information
provided by another person.18 2 In addition, the contract should
specifically identify the applicable law governing the transaction. 183
181. See Leigh Ann K Epperson, Environmental Traps for Contractors, 7 S.C.
ENVTL. L.J. 135 (stating contracting parties are "free to shift liability by means of
assumption or indemnity agreements.").
182. See FINEMAN, supra note 1, at 239 (discussing third party beneficiary doc-
trine as focusing on intent of parties and setting standards in third party
relationship).
183. See id. (asserting that court's role in construction process is to interpret
and enforce contract in accordance with parties' expectations).
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Most importantly, consultants should not undertake services
beyond those specifically delineated in the contract.184 The con-
tract should specifically set forth the consultant's intent and under-
standing that the consultant's work will not benefit a third party.18 5
Indeed, the contractor should obtain assurances and written affir-
mations from the client that the work is not intended to benefit a
particular class of persons, for example, prospective purchasers of
real estate or banks.186
Consultants should document the governing standards and re-
quirements that frame the scope of their undertaking and disclaim
responsibility for toxic, hazardous, or other dangerous substances
that may be discovered. Furthermore, it is helpful for consultants
to encourage their clients to make written representations and war-
ranties concerning their knowledge of the undertaking in question.
Finally, a consultant should always obtain appropriate insurance
coverage for their work.
V. CONCLUSION
Lawyers for environmental consultants must be aware that
their clients are increasingly named in lawsuits filed by plaintiffs
with whom the consultant did not contract. Consultant liability
may arise under common law principles and under the federal
Superfund statute. Recent case law indicates a trend toward ex-
panding the scope of a consultant's liabilities. Under the common
law, the Grand Street Artists decision has the potential to drastically
increase the exposure of consultants because, at some point, practi-
cally everyone involved in the environmental consulting business
must file a report available for public inspection. 18 7 In the
Superfund context, the decisions in Kaiser Aluminum and Tan-
glewood are likely to result in new claims against consultants.1 88
Nevertheless, other recent cases indicate that a consultant's du-
ties are not limitless. 18 9 Even if a consultant makes a mistake, it
184. See id. (noting that parties have opportunity in contracting process to
delineate their performance obligations and risks and benefits of construction).
185. See id. at 235 (discussing application of "intent to benefit" text to terms of
contract creating third party beneficiary relationship).
186. See id. (examining parties' intent at time of contracting for third party
beneficiary).
187. For a discussion of Grand Street Artists and its implications, see supra notes,
74-96 and accompanying text.
188. For a discussion of Kaiser Aluminum and Tanglewood and their implica-
tions, see supra notes 158-172 and accompanying text.
189. For a complete discussion of the traditional, conservative approach to
consultant liability to third parties, see supra notes 28-56 and accompanying text.
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does not result in liability if no duty was owed to the plaintiff or if
there was no justifiable reliance on the mistake. 190 Further, in the
Superfund context, some courts refuse to hold consultants strictly
liable and require a plaintiff to prove negligence. 191 Additionally,
some courts strictly enforce contractual limitation of liability
clauses. 19 2 Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned by this
discussion is that there must be a heightened sensitivity to the po-
tential for new claims. Although all risks cannot be completely
eliminated, consultants and their lawyers can, and should, take con-
crete practical steps to avoid or reduce their liability to third
parties.19 3
190. See Midwest Aluminum Mfg. Co. v. General Elec. Co., No. 4:90-CV-143, 1993
WL 725569, at *6 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (emphasizing that "duty does not arise every-
where with everyone," and that there must be requisite relationship to give rise to
legal obligation for benefit of third party).
191. See, e.g., United States v. CMDG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 706 (3d Cir. 1996)
(requiring plaintiff to prove negligence).
192. For a complete discussion of the methods of reducing liability to third
parties, see supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
193. For a thorough discussion of consultant liability, see generally Epperson,
supra note 181.
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